Addiction to Defense: Why Israel’s Iron Dome Does Not Win Wars
View of a house which was directly hit in a missile attack from Lebanon, in Katzrin, northern Israel, Aug. 21, 2024. Photo by Michael Giladi/Flash90.
by Ari Sacher
I remember the night of Jan. 17, 1991, as if it were only yesterday. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait. After Saddam repeatedly ignored an American demand to withdraw his troops, American coalition forces attacked Iraq, starting the First Gulf War on January 15. Israel was not part of the allied coalition. Nevertheless, Saddam had, since the invasion, made repeated threats to fire missiles on Israel, potentially armed with chemical and biological warheads if the American coalition dared to attack. Saddam made good on his promise, and on the night of the 17th, Iraq opened fire on Tel Aviv and Haifa. One week earlier, I attended a wedding of a friend, a Major in the Israel Air Force. Many high-ranking IAF officers were at the wedding, and everyone was saying the same thing: “Saddam will never fire on us and if he does, then we will reduce Iraq to rubble.” Well, they fired on us, and we did nothing.
This was a watershed moment. One of the most critical lessons that Israel learned that January was that we must invest in missile defense. Until then, every shekel spent on defense was one less shekel spent on an airplane, a tank, or some other offensive weapon. The Iraqi attacks made it clear that the Israel Home Front along with critical infrastructure was now helplessly under threat and must be protected.
Israel is now the only country in the world that is protected by a multi-layer missile defense system, consisting of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2, and Arrow-3. Soon these systems will be joined by Arrow-4 and the Iron Beam laser. Since the early 2000s, when Arrow-2 first became operational, Israel’s missile defense umbrella has intercepted thousands of rockets, missiles, and drones, saving countless lives. Having played a part in the development of some of these systems, this kind of performance is a source of pride for me.
And yet. Since Oct. 7, I have had a gnawing feeling in my gut about Israel’s widespread use of missile defense systems. A recent article by Seth Frantzman in the Jerusalem Post, called “How an addiction to the Iron Dome doctrine has eroded Israel’s deterrence – analysis,” went a long way in putting my feelings into words. I have briefed hundreds of American lawmakers on Iron Dome. While my briefing has evolved over the years, two of the points I make have remained unchanged:
Systems like Iron Dome prevent wars. The Israel Defense Forces and our adversaries operate using a certain unwritten quid pro quo in which Israel responds to an attack based upon the amount of damage actually incurred. If the soldiers are targeted, then the response will be limited. The IDF will fire on empty buildings and announce that they have attacked “Enemy Infrastructure.” Since Oct. 7, I have seen what looks like the same Lebanese house destroyed more than a dozen times. The extent of the IDF response is ratcheted up if soldiers are hurt or killed, or if civilians are targeted, hurt, or killed. Interception of attacking rockets greatly reduces Israeli casualties, thus preventing an immediate IDF response and allowing time for behind-the-scenes negotiation and reducing the potential for all-out war.
Systems like Iron Dome are not the end-all and be-all of Israel’s defense posture. Missile defense systems give the IDF time to assess the situation and to plan an optimum response. But make no mistake – systems like Iron Dome and David’s Sling do not win wars. Wars will always be won by imposing one’s will upon the enemy. A knight can have the most impenetrable suit of armor. Without a sword, he might not lose the battle, but he will never be able to achieve victory.
Nevertheless, over the past decade, these points have begun to ring hollow. Israel is becoming ever more dependent upon defensive systems and ever more hesitant to use force. Frantzman writes, “The country shifted from being ready for daring, rapid wars, to becoming a society surrounded by walls and fences.”
Consider:
When Israel unilaterally evacuated the Gaza Strip in 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon promised that any and all future Gazan rocket fire would result in a crushing and immediate IDF response. This promise was never implemented. Whenever Hamas rocket fire became unbearable, the IDF was content to “mow the lawn” in Gaza in which it would use artillery fire, air-launched weapons, and perhaps a small incursion of soldiers in order to “cut Hamas down to size.” Since 2005, Gazan lawns have been mowed every two years or so, and until Oct. 7, this strategy seemed to be working.
For the past 20 years, Israel has been putting up fences between her and her neighbors. The first fence began to go up in 2002, after terror attacks in the second Intifada committed by Palestinian residents of the West Bank killed hundreds of Israelis. This “Security Fence” was built very near the pre-1967 “Green Line” that served as the armistice line between Israel and Jordan. The fence took nearly 10 years to complete, but since its completion, the fence has drastically reduced the number of terror attacks committed by West-Bank Palestinians. In December 2021, an above-ground and underground barrier was built between Gaza and Israel. The barrier was equipped with high-tech sensors and remote-control weapon stations that would prevent any terrorist from even getting near. The barrier was impenetrable, and until Oct. 7, this strategy seemed to be working.
Israel’s readiness to hide behind barriers of steel, concrete, and interceptors has led to a loss of initiative. From the end of the First Lebanon War 1982 until June 2000, Israel controlled a “security zone” in southern Lebanon in order to prevent terror attacks on Israeli towns situated near the northern border. One of my friends commanded the security zone for four years. He told me it was the most difficult position he ever held. Soldiers were sitting ducks, waiting for Hezbollah attacks, which always came. There was a steady flow of caskets from Lebanon into Israel. But as a result of the peace and quiet that the security zone enabled, towns like Metula and Qiryat Shemona prospered. Factories produced electronic parts for missiles. Wineries grew like mushrooms after the rain, soon followed by dairies. Wine and cheese at a winery overlooking Lebanon became a favorite way for Israelis from the center of the country to spend a Friday morning.
This time around, things are different. On Oct. 8, Israelis living within three miles of the border were ordered to evacuate their homes because of the clear and present danger of a Hezbollah incursion that could dwarf the massacre of Oct. 7. Nearly 100,000 people fled their homes to hotels, friends, and relatives around the country, turning the upper Galilee into a de facto security zone inside Israel. More than 10 months later, they still have not returned, nor does it seem likely that they will be allowed to return, at least for the near future. Meanwhile, Hezbollah fires rockets and anti-tank missiles with near impunity. Iron Dome intercepts most of the rockets, but the anti-tank weapons are much more difficult to stop. A colleague of mine, who just completed two months of reserve duty in Metula, tells me that there is not one house in town that has not been hit by a missile. Rebuilding the town will take years. As time goes on, it seems less and less likely that people will return at all.
In April, Avichai Stern, the Mayor of Qiryat Shemona, spoke to a USIEA Congressional Delegation. He told us that he was doing everything he could to keep a sense of community even while the members of the community are dispersed over 300 miles. He tries to ensure they stay in the same hotels, and he sends teachers to teach Qiryat Shemona children living in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and the Dead Sea. Even so, the mayor feels like he is fighting a losing battle. Hand on your heart: Would you return? The adverse impact on IDF deterrence is tangible. Last month, Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, said in a speech that the residents of the Upper Galilee will return home when he says so. I can’t say he’s wrong.
Frantzman concludes on a somber note: “The killing of Israelis in the North is becoming a new norm, all because strategists put all their faith in air defense alone. This recalls previous historic marches of folly, such as the Maginot Line between France and Germany. Countries that rely solely on walled defenses are doomed to end up with enemies who learn how to pierce the defenses. History teaches us this. Israel’s historic leaders understood this. Israel will need to rethink its reliance on air defense which went from buying time to eroding Israel’s deterrence, preventing her from making tough decisions necessary to secure the country.”
I will also close on a somber note, but one that is more personal. I think back to my Congressional briefings of how Iron Dome has prevented war. And then I ask myself, what would have happened had Israel not had Iron Dome, or if we were not so reliant upon it? While my powers of prophecy are limited, I think it fair to say that chances are that a repeated mowing the lawn would have eventually become insufficient. Possibly after one well-placed Hamas rocket hit a school full of children, the IDF would have been forced to enter Gaza – like they did in October 2023 – and to destroy Hamas as a military and political entity once and for all, instead of letting the cancer fester. Such a move might very well have prevented the October 7 massacre.
The Hezbollah would likely have been deterred. Perhaps Nasrallah would have accepted the terms of UN Resolution 1701 and unilaterally moved his forces north of the Litani River, obviating the requirement for any security zone. Perhaps Iran would have watched from afar as her “ring of fire” surrounding Israel was slowly but surely extinguished. Perhaps the Mullahs would have ceased their run for nuclear weapons. We will never know.
Ari Sacher is chief systems engineer of Iron Dome, and a senior policy advisor to U.S. Israel Education Association (USIEA), a nonprofit organization based in Birmingham that advances important dialogue and cooperation between bipartisan senior government leaders in the United States and Israel by filling existing information gaps and enhancing understanding of issues critical to a mutually beneficial partnership. Founded in 2011, USIEA empowers U.S. leaders with innovative initiatives on the path to Middle East peace, connects Members of Congress with direct access to West Bank visits, and educates as thought leaders in the media and through strategic global partnerships.
